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THE PRACTICE OF PRECEDENT: ANASTASOFF,
NONCITATION RULES, AND THE MEANING OF
PRECEDENT IN AN INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY
LAUREN ROBEL*
Like sailing, gardening, politics, and poetry, law and ethnography are
crafts of place: they work by the light of local knowledge. The instant
case, Palsgraff or the Charles River Bridge, provides for law not only
the ground from which reflection departs but also the object towards
which it tends, and for ethnography, the settled practice, potlatch, or
couvade, does the same. Whatever else anthropology and jurisprudence
may have in common-vagrant erudition and a fantastical air-they have
in common the artisan task of seeing broad principles in parochial form.
"Wisdom," as an African proverb has it, "comes out of an ant heap."'
INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to say that a decision by a court is, or is not, precedential?
At the most straightforward level, to describe a decision as "precedent" is to say
that the decision must be acknowledged, at the least, by the court that issues it;
a decision is precedential if courts are bound to follow it or distinguish it, given
certain conditions.2 When courts adopt rules, as have most appellate courts,
which dictate that certain decisions are not precedent, they adopt legal rules
about which we can either agree or disagree on the usual grounds-fairness,3
utility,4 accountability,5 predictability,6 and the like.
* Associate Dean and Val Nolan Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington. My thanks to the participants in the symposium, Caught in the Middle: A National
Symposium on the Role ofState Intermediate Appellate Courts, March 30-31, 2001, hosted by the
IndianaUniversity School of Law-Indianapolis, and the participants in the symposium, Managing
the Federal Courts: Will the Ninth Circuit be a Model for Change?, March 24, 2000, hosted by
the University of California, Davis, School of Law, for helpful comments on various versions of
this paper.
1. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYs IN INTERPRETIvE
ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (1983).
2. For what remains the most thorough explication and critique of the argument from
precedent, see Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, The Myth ofthe Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions
and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REv. 940 (1989)
(discussing differential access to unpublished opinions between government litigants and others).
For an argument that publication rules are not the "rules," because there are no sanctions for
violating them and no true policing mechanisms, see Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not
Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 157, 164 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, In Defense of Less Precedential
Opinions: A Reply to Chief Judge Martin, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2025, 2040 (1999) (arguing that
nonprecedential decisions could aid in law development); Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt,
Please Don't Cite This!, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 44 (arguing that the primary purpose of
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But, as the quotation from Geertz suggests, rules exist within bodies of
practice, discrete cultures, and interpretive communities7 that give them meaning.
In a deeply common-law system such as ours, precedent is also a practice that
places requirements on both lawyers and judges. Moreover, the practice of
precedent does not rely on the above-stated rule of judicial acknowledgment
because, at least linguistically, we refer to all decisions that might have
persuasive force as "precedent," despite the lack of a legal rule requiring either
adherence to them or an attempt to distinguish them. Courts also routinely treat
nonbinding authority as precedent, in the sense that they feel an obligation to
attempt to distinguish that authority. Although it is common for judges to write
that they are bound by precedents with which they disagree, it is rare for a court
to dismiss the relevance of a cited case for the sole reason that it is not required,
by the narrow legal rule of stare decisis, to follow that case's holding. Our
cultural conception of precedent, then, includes more than a sense that opinions
have predictive value. It also includes shared understandings ofthejudicial role,
which include burdens of justification. Thus, "precedent" can have multiple
meanings, both linguistically and practically.
One important interpretive community for judicial opinions, lawyers and
judges, has recently renewed the debate about the meaning of precedent, as the
result of a short-lived federal appellate decision holding unconstitutional the
practice of condemning certain of a court's opinions to nonprecedential status.
In this essay, I examine the concrete practices that surround appellate courts'
publication rules and the common cultural commitments, as expressed through
those practices, that lawyers and judges share about the meaning of judicial
noncitation rules is to permit judges to deal expeditiously with caseloads). That caseloads require
nonpublication is asserted even by judges who oppose the noncitation rules. See, e.g., Richard S.
Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 221 (1999).
However, the publication practices of the various appellate courts suggest that the rate of
publication is dictated more by local norms than by caseload. See discussion infra Part I; see also
Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN
BAG 2D 17, 19 (2000) (arguing against justifying "on high theory a practice that is in fact justified
for simple efficiency reasons").
5. See, e.g., THOMASE. BAKER, RATIONINGJUSTICEONAPPEAL: THEPROBLEMSOFTHEU.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 128-29 (1994); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism,
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L.
REv. 273, 282-83 (1996).
6. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt& James J. Brudney, StalkingSecretLaw: WhatPredicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 113-15 (2001)
(demonstrating substantial intercircuit variation in the application of rules on the publication of
opinions).
7. An interpretive community is a group of readers that share understandings because of
common cultural commitments. See generally STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989);
William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation, 95
Nw. U. L. REv. 629 (2001) (applying the concept to legal interpretation).
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decisions. Evidence from the federal appellate system shows that large numbers
of participants in that system claim to behave in ways that would make sense
only if unpublished (and therefore nonprecedential) opinions' are, in some sense
that I will explore, precedential. Those participants include not only lawyers
who practice in the federal appellate courts but also the judges themselves and
the publishers who provide for the opinions' pervasive dissemination.9 This
evidence suggests that lawyers and judges value these opinions despite the rules
limiting citation. This valuation, in turn, suggests a cultural, rather than a rule-
bound, conception of stare decisis.
I then examine the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Anastasoffv. United States,'
which has served as a focal point for a renewed discussion of citation bans both
inside and outside of the judiciary. Anastasoff raises fundamental questions
about the meaning of precedent and thejudicial role, and has been the wellspring
of recent judicial criticism of citation rules in the federal appellate courts.
Anastasoff and its progeny confirm that our cultural commitment to precedent
includes a normative commitment to justification.
Finally, I briefly examine the argument against abandoning the courts'
current publication and citation rules-chiefly the argument that such rules are
required by caseload-and find that it is less persuasive than commonly thought.
More importantly, it is less compelling than the damage to the courts' perceived
legitimacy that results from the continuation of the publication and citation rules
in their current form. For many participants in the federal appellate system,
uncitable opinions are part of the daily diet of cases that they examine and
analyze in practice. The ban on their citation strikes at the metaphorical heart of
the common-law system.
8. In this essay, I will refer to those opinions that are designated nonprecedential opinions
by federal appellate court rule as "unpublished." Though I use the term "unpublished opinions,"
it is important to note that I am referring to those opinions that have been designated uncitable by
rule and, therefore, not submitted for publication in an official reporter.
9. These opinions are widely available in searchable databases such as Westlaw and Lexis,
see Michael Hannon, Developments and Practice Notes: A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESs. 199, 209 n.48 (2001).
"Westlaw estimates there are about 336,000 unpublished federal appellate opinions in its case
databases." Id. Others appear in commercial specialty reporters. Id. at 206. See also Boggs &
Brooks, supra note 4, at 18 (2000) ("The 'unpublished opinions' debate.., is badly misnamed.
Between Lexis and Westlaw, Internet sites maintained by universities and some of the circuit courts
of appeals, and networks of attorneys practicing in particular fields, it is the rare opinion that is not
disseminated for mass consumption.")
10. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In its
subsequent rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit stated, "The constitutionality of that portion of
Rule 28A(i) which says that unpublished opinions have no precedential effect remains an open
question in this Circuit." Anastasoff, 235 F.3d at 1056.
2002]
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I. THE UNIVERSE OF PRECEDENT AND THE WORLD OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
In the federal courts of appeals, widespread citation and publication
restrictions date from 1976, when the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System recommended that such restrictions be adopted to deal
with caseload volume and the "proliferation of precedent."" In state
intermediate appellate courts, the use of citation and publication restrictions is
yet more recent.'2 Thus, federal appellate courts have about twenty-five years of
experience with publication and citation rules, and all have adopted limited
publication plans and limitations on citation. 3 Those courts now publish
decisions in the official reporters in only thirty-four percent of all cases in which
appellants had counsel and in only twenty-three percent of cases overall. 4 In
addition, the rates of publication, as shown in Table I, " vary widely from a low
of seventeen percent for the Eleventh Circuit, to a high of seventy-one percent
for the Seventh Circuit. 6
The rationale for publication and citation rules has shifted as a result of
experience with those rules. When the rules were first suggested to the Judicial
Conference of the United States Courts in 1964, the rationale was the prosaic one
of dealing with "the ever increasing practical difficulty and economic cost of
establishing and maintaining accessible private and public law library
facilities." 7 The 1975 Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
11. Publication and citation rules in the federal appellate courts had their genesis earlier, in
a 1964 Judicial Conference resolution permitting federal courts to limit publication, but most
publication regimes date from the report of the so-called Hruska Commission. SeeCOMM'NONTHE
REVISION OF THE FED. CT. APP. SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE-A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1975) [hereinafter COMM'N
PRELIMINARY REPORT]; Robel, supra note 3, at 945; Hannon, supra note 9, at 207-08 (discussing
timeline for federal court publication rules); id at 253-85 (compiling state and federal court citation
bans).
12. "As of 1981, only sixteen states operated under a nonpublication regime." David M.
Gunn, "Unpublished Opinions Shall Not Be Cited asAuthority ": The Emerging Contours of Texas
Rule ofAppellate Procedure 90(i), 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 115, 124 (1992). In 1968, thirty states still
published opinions in all of their cases, as opposed to eighteen in 1974 and only six by 1989.
Thomas B. Marvell, State Appellate Court Responses to Caseload Growth, 72 JUDICATURE 282,
288 (1989).
13. See Hannon, supra note 9, at 253-57. Nine federal circuits ban citation of "unpublished"
dispositions as precedent, except in related cases to establish a defense ofres judicata or for similar
reasons. Three circuits allow citation to these opinions as persuasive authority, and two, though
disfavoring citation, permit it if no published opinion would serve as well.
14. See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. CTS. OF APPEALS, WORKING
PAPERS 112 (1998) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS].
15. See tbl.1, infra.
16. I will return to this table in the discussion of circuit publication cultures infra.
17. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THEADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OFTHEUNITED STATES COURTS
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System, commonly known as the Hruska Commission, approached its
recommendations for limited publication from the perspective of caseload
crunch. While repeating the idea that there were library cost savings to be had
from limited publication,"8 that Commission suggested that judges could accrue
significant time savings with limited publication, "for the judges no longer sense
the same need to polish the prose and to monitor each phrase as they do with
opinions which are intended for general distribution."' 9 In its final report, the
Commission linked its recommendation for adopting limited publication plans
to the time opinions take to write and the possibilities for reduced appellate case
processing time.2"
Recognizing that appellate courts serve both lawmaking and dispute-
resolving functions, the plans that courts adopted all followed similar criteria,
attempting to distinguish in advance between opinions that make law and those
that merely apply it." While there were variations (for example, some courts
counseled publication when a case involved an issue of continuing public
interest), the central rationale of all the plans was that non-lawmaking opinions
need not be published.' Despite the similarities in criteria, however, the circuits
quickly diverged in the percentage of opinions each published and made citable.
By the time the Federal Courts Study Committee completed its work in 1990,
and despite the huge increase in the federal appellate caseload that in part
prompted that Committee's work,' fifty-eight percent of federal appellatejudges
believed that they almost always produced published opinions in the cases in
which they "should be written."'24 Another thirty percent believed that they only
"sometimes" had to forgo writing opinions for publication in cases in which they
"should be written," presumably because of caseload pressures.' Given the
significant variations in publication rates across circuits both then and now, these
figures suggest divergent local norms with respect to what cases meet the criteria
I 1 (1964) (reporting, in light of these concerns, a Judicial Conference resolution "[tihat thejudges
of the courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication of only those opinions
which are of general precedential value and that opinions authorized to be published be succinct').
18. COMM'N PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 72 ("When large numbers of such
opinions [with limited precedential value] find their way into the reports, they create logistical
problems in terms of sheer space and library maintenance expenditures, and the burden of fruitless
research is compounded.").
19. Id.
20. COMM'N ON REVIsION OF THE FED. CT. APP. Sys., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE-FINAL REPORT 50 (1975) [hereinafter COMM'N
FINAL REPORT].
21. Robel, supra note 3, at 941.
22. Id.
23. The Committee itself described caseload as a "crisis." REPORTOFTHE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE 4 (1990).
24. 2 FED CTs. STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 87 (1990).
25. Id.
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for publication of the various appellate courts' plans.26 This divergence exists
despite the striking similarities among the plans themselves and the fact that each
contained criteria for predicting which cases were likely to have sufficient lasting
value as precedent to justify the additional thought and effort required for
published decisions.' Although the publication rates reported in Table 1 suggest
some connection between workload and publication rates (for example, the
Eleventh Circuit, which has more merits terminations per judge than any other,
also has the lowest publication rate), that connection is neither tight nor obvious.
For instance, the Fourth Circuit's publication rate of nineteen percent is very low
given its also low workload rank, and the Eighth Circuit's publication rate is
relatively high despite its high workload rank.
Publication limits are coupled in most circuits with citation bans, which vary
in severity.2" Citation bans have been controversial from the beginning. The
Hruska Commission believed that such bans were necessary to discourage
commercial publication (which it believed would undermine cost savings
associated with writing less polished opinions)29 and more fundamentally, to deal
with the problem of unequal access to these opinions." However, it noted that
there were members of the bar and bench who "consider[ed] it undesirable and
indeed improper for a court to deny a litigant the right to refer to action
previously taken by the court."'" Nevertheless, citation bans were adopted almost
exclusively because of concerns about unequal access to unpublished opinions.
The Hruska Commission feared "that the publication plans would result in a
secret body of applicable and pertinent law available only to certain advantaged
litigants and the courts before which they routinely appeared."32
II. THE PRACTICE OF PRECEDENT: WHAT LAWYERS AND JUDGES Do
Publication plans were intended to make certain opinions disposable by
identifying those cases that would add no new information to the canon of
substantive law, while limiting citation to those opinions to ensure that lawyers
would not spend time reading them and considering their impact or relationship
26. Lauren K. Robel, Caseload andJudging: JudicialAdaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU
L. REv. 3, 55 (noting a changing "collective sense of what constitutes 'appropriate' attention to a
case...").
27. Id. at 50.
28. Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing
Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 1. APP. PRAC. & PROcESS 251, 253-85 (2001).
29. COMM'N FINAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 51 ("To allow litigants to cite opinions which
the court has designated as 'not for publication' invites publication by private publishers, thus
defeating the basic purposes of the program.").
30. ld Despite citation bans, the Commission's concerns with unequal access were well-
founded. See Robel, supra note 3 (reporting on a study of government litigants' use of unpublished
dispositions).
31. Id.
32. Robel, supra note 3, at 946 (recounting testimony before Hruska Commission).
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to new cases. But, recent surveys of both litigants and judges in the federal
appellate system demonstrate that these rules fail to dissuade substantial numbers
of attorneys and judges from these activities.3 The surveys, developed by the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts (also known as the
White Commission, in honor of its Chair, Justice White), were sent to all federal
appellate and trial judges, and to a random group of attorneys who had cases
before the courts of appeals within a specified time frame.34 The surveys yield
important information about the behavior of both the consumers and producers
of opinions.
A. Lawyers
The surveys indicate that attorneys do not share the view that there are too
many precedential opinions available. When asked to rank a number of possible
priorities for courts of appeals, attorneys rank avoiding the "proliferation of
published opinions" next to last. 5 Further, when asked the most frequent reason
for their inability to predict appellate outcomes, as reflected in Table 2,36 fair
percentages of lawyers in many circuits said that their difficulty was due to either
the lack of circuit precedent on point or a lack of clarity in existing circuit
precedent.
More important, in agreement with earlier evidence relating to government
attorneys,3 7 the responses indicate that many attorneys monitor unpublished
opinions. Though the reasoning behind the citation and publication rules would
predict that a significant number of lawyers would regularly read all of the
published opinions in their circuits, at least in their fields (Table 2, Column 3),31
they would hardly predict that twenty to twenty-five percent of attorneys in five
circuits would do the same with unpublished opinions (Table 2, Column 4).39
Moreover, if the unpublished opinions come up in research in preparation for an
actual case, the numbers of lawyers who report that they read the opinions jumps
33. I have previously argued that lawyers are not dissuaded from using unpublished opinions
by rules against citation, because the nonpublication rules select cases for publication on the basis
of mistaken assumptions about the nature of precedent. I identified three assumptions that I
believed were mistaken: that only lawmaking and not dispute-resolving opinions give lawyers
important information; that the only opinions that are important are those that create, rather than
apply, rules; and that the plans would operate neutrally with respect to the subject-matter of
opinions. See Robel, supra note 3, at 947.
34. The Commission published both its Final Report and Working Papers in 1998. The
survey results are reported in the Working Papers. The response rate for each of the surveys was
high: eighty-six percent for appellate judges; eighty-one percent for district judges; and fifty-one
percent for appellate counsel. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 14, at 3.
35. Id. at 81-82. It was narrowly edged out of last place by attorneys' lack of interest in
"mediation or pre-argument conferencing." Id.
36. See tbl.2, infra.
37. See Robel, supra note 3, at 957-59.
38. See tbl.2, infra.
39. See id.
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significantly (Table 2, Column 5).40 In no circuit do fewer than twenty-eight
percent of responding attorneys read these cases, and in seven circuits over forty
percent read them.
Indeed, Table 2, Columns 4 and 5,41 when taken together, suggest that
significant percentages of lawyers do not feel free to ignore these opinions either
generally or with respect to specific cases. If we assume that lawyers are not
reading these opinions as a leisure activity, then the most plausible alternative is
that they are reading them because they provide useful information in support of
their clients' cases. Two lawyers from an eminent law firm make the point
succinctly:
It is true that citation prohibitions allow lawyers and courts to ignore
unpublished opinions with the confidence that they have not overlooked
binding precedent. There are two reasons, however, why this concern
is minimal. First, for many issues, there are few on-point but uncitable
appellate decisions, so the time it takes to review these decisions is short.
For the most part, the myth that there exist great batches of redundant
unpublished appellate cases is true only in certain discrete areas of law
where meritless cases are litigated even to appeal .... Second, in
practice, citation prohibitions hardly ease the case-review burden on the
prudent practitioner. Practitioners often review uncitable cases to mine
them for new ideas. A prudent lawyer also reviews unpublished cases,
lack ofprecedential value aside, because they indicate how the appellate
court has ruled in the past and thus might rule in the future. Moreover,
it behooves counsel to review unpublished opinions because they still
may influence a court that reads (or remembers deciding) them itself.42
For these lawyers and others like them, the rule-based conception of
precedent embodied in "citation prohibitions" is almost beside the point because
their practice is based on a cultural conception of precedent that views all
decisions as evidence of reasoning that might be persuasive in the future. True,
the citation rules might save the lawyer who ignores unpublished opinions from
charges of malpractice (giving them "confidence" that they can be ignored), but
it simply is not consistent with "prudent" practice in a common-law environment
to ignore these opinions.
Moreover, other evidence strongly suggests that, even under a rule-based
conception of precedent, lawyers are correct to read these opinions. A recent
study found that unpublished opinions are routinely (indeed, promiscuously)
cited by the federal courts of appeals and relied upon by the federal district
courts.43 The study found that the courts of appeals have cited unpublished
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, The Constitutionality of "No Citation" Rules, 3
J. APP. PRAC. & PRocEss, 287, 301-02 (2001). The authors, attorneys at Shearman & Sterling,
argue that citation bans violate the First Amendment.
43. See Hannon, supra note 9, at 235 tbl.6; see also Johns v. State, 35 P.3d 53, 65 (Alaska
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dispositions (usually their own) 4460 times, and that 3161 federal district court
opinions cite unpublished federal circuit court opinions, relying on them for legal
support in 1967 cases.' In this light, it is rational for lawyers to stay apprised of
unpublished dispositions, for they often explicitly influence outcomes. It is
impossible to determine how much more often they influence outcomes more
subtly.
The survey responses of appellate and district court judges confirm that
lawyers are not the only ones taking notice of"noncitable" opinions on a regular
basis.
B. Judges
As Table 3, Column 2" shows, many districtjudges regularly read all of the
unpublished opinions from their circuit courts. When significant numbers of
district judges report regularly reading these opinions, it suggests that they are
doing so to predict how their court of appeals would decide an issue. In some
instances, district judges may be forced to monitor these opinions because their
circuits provide so little published caselaw. In the Fourth Circuit, for instance,
where the published corpus represents only nineteen percent of the merits
terminations, almost sixty percent of the districtjudges monitor all or most of the
unpublished appellate opinions. In circuits with higher publication rates, like the
Eighth Circuit, the relatively high number of district judges reporting that they
regularly read the unpublished opinions might suggest problems with the
application of the rules. My working hypothesis is that these district judges are
not behaving irrationally, so if they are reading the opinions regularly, they must
believe that the decisions either predict outcomes or provide direction. In five
of the circuits, twenty percent or more of the district judges regularly read
unpublished opinions.
The survey also asked the district court judges whether there were issues or
areas of circuit law that were particularly inconsistent or difficult to know. As
shown in Table 3, Column 3," affirmative responses to this question varied by
circuit, from a low of thirteen percent in the First Circuit to a high of fifty-seven
percent in the D.C. Circuit. The judges indicated that the difficulty they faced
was largely due to inconsistencies among published opinions, but in five circuits,
twenty-four percent to over forty percent of the judges attributed difficulty to
inconsistencies between published and unpublished opinions. These numbers
Ct. App. 2001) (Mannheimer, J., concurring) (notingthatAlaska's lower courtjudges routinely rely
on unpublished Alaska opinions).
44. Hannon, supra note 9, at 235. Hannon believes the last figure to be a conservative
estimate because he counted only those cases where the court "explicitly cited the unpublished case
for legal authority." Id. For these courts, Anastasoff was something of a relief: several cite it for
the proposition that their discussion of unpublished opinions is not improper. See, e.g.,
McGuinness v. Pepe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 227, 235 (D. Mass. 2001).
45. See tbl.3, infra.
46. See id.
20021 407
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suggest that the judges are not only monitoring the opinions, but also are
analyzing them in light of existing published opinions in an attempt to predict the
development of doctrine within their circuits. Additionally, district judges are
as skeptical as lawyers about their ability to find a precedent when they need one.
As shown in Column 4,47 in eight circuits, twenty percent or more of the judges
attributed the inability to know an area of law in their circuit to the lack of
precedent.
Appellate judges are also consumers of unpublished appellate opinions.
There are three reasons why appellate judges might devote time to reading most
"nonprecedential" opinions. First, they may feel obligated to monitor the
application of their circuit's publication rule. Second, they may feel a duty to
stay abreast of the overall work of their courts. Finally, they may believe that
there is important informafion contained in the opinions that is not available
elsewhere.
It seems most plausible that appellate judges read unpublished opinions to
monitor compliance with publication rules. The publication rates, as noted
earlier, suggest that, among the courts of appeals, there are different cultur es with
respect to publication. As shown in Table 3, columns 1 and 2,48 with one notable
exception, the courts with the strongest commitments to publication (the First,
Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits) also have the highest number of judges
reporting that they read unpublished opinions. 9 These results suggest that those
courts continue to be less comfortable with nonpublication and monitor
unpublished opinions more closely to ensure compliance with the rules (these
figures do not, however, demonstrate that they are successful in achieving
compliance; we need to look to the lawyer-consumers of the opinions for that
information).
Proponents of citation and publication plans hoped, apparently in vain, that
the plans would work so well that the unpublished opinions' inherent
worthlessness would discourage their use." Appellate courts have tried several
unsuccessful strategies to discourage the use of unpublished opinions. In the
early days of the plans, they attempted to withhold these opinions from
commercial publishers, reasoning that lawyers could not cite what they could not
fimd." Commercial publishers have, however, responded to demand for the
opinions and now, with few exceptions, unpublished opinions are generally
available in the searchable electronic databases. 2 The opinions are also available
47. See id.
48. See id
49. The one exception is the Fourth Circuit, which has almost the lowest rate of publication
and where half of the appellate judges regularly read the unpublished opinions.
50. See Robel, supra note 3, at 944.
51. See id. at 944-45.
52. See Hannon, supra note 9, at 210-13. The Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits "have
banned electronic dissemination of unpublished opinions, and these cases are neither added to
Westlaw or LEXIS nor available from the courts' websites." Id. at 211. Hannon found, however,
that a large number of unpublished opinions from these circuits are in fact available in Westlaw's
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on court websites and in specialty reporters.53
Courts have also tried simply not writing opinions at all." However, this
option proved unattractive to litigants and judges alike,55 because to strip
opinions of all rationale is to leave them vulnerable to claims of lack of
accountability. And since nonpublication is so routinely coupled with lack of
oral argument, neither litigants nor lawyers can discern whether the court either
understood or acknowledged their arguments.56 As I will discuss below, the
failure to write an opinion at all is inconsistent with deeply-held conceptions of
the judicial role.
III. FRACTURES IN THE INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY: ANASTASOFF AND
THE RENEWED DEBATE
The evidence from every quarter is that substantial numbers of those
involved with the federal appellate courts-judges, litigants, and publishers
alike-do not sharply distinguish in their practices between published, citable
opinions, and unpublished, noncitable opinions. The one glaring exception is
that the latter cannot be cited by lawyers, although they are apparently often cited
by courts. Also, because the judges are reading unpublished opinions, they are
also presumably making thejudgments thattypically attend analysis of opinions:
that this case is like or unlike another, well-reasoned or not, persuasive or not.
When trial judges, lawyers, and litigants find that their best precedent is one that
they are not supposed to cite, they face a clash between the cultural conception
of precedent evident in their behavior, and the rule-based conception of precedent
embodied in citation bans.
In point of fact, the view of precedent embodied in the publication rules is
itself both cultural and rule based. These rules typically couple a command (i.e.,
citation is banned or limited) with a set of goals for nonpublication that echo a
practice-based view of precedent. Characteristic of these rules, the First Circuit
couples a citation ban with a set of guidelines that attempts to identify those
opinions that would "serve... as a significant guide to future litigants," because
they articulate a new rule of law or modify an established rule.57 The Second
Circuit describes the goal as the attempt to predict "those cases in which.., each
CTA database. See id In order to understand how "banning" the dissemination of documents of
public record could be possible, one must comprehend the dynamics of the relationship between
the courts and legal publishers.
53. Seeid. at206.
54. Both the Fifth Circuit and the Third Circuit have tried and abandoned this approach. See
Philip Shuchman & Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifh Circuit: Can Judges
Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980).
55. See Robel, supra note 3, at 943 (discussing reasons why courts abandoned summary
dispositions).
56. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 14, at 110 tbl.8 (noting that only one circuit publishes
as many as ten percent of its decisions made without oral argument).
57. ISTCIR.R. 36(b).
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judge of the panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be served [by
publication].""8  The Third Circuit looks for those opinions that have
"precedential or institutional value." 9 The courts look, in other words, to the
future value of the opinions. However, unless the courts publish almost nothing,
the futurie value of what they write is not, culturally speaking, determined by the
authoring judge alone; rather, it is determined by consumers. Hence the citation
rules, which attempt to strip the opinions of value by fiat.
The rules ask judges through language that echoes the common-law
understanding of the meaning of precedent to predict the future value of their
opinions to consumers. That common-law understanding itself depends upon
consumers' perception of future value. The rules, therefore, embody the clash
between cultural, practice-based views and rule-based views of precedent. It is
trivially easy to find examples of cases that, according to the criteria of the
publication plans, should have been published, because in hindsight (or perhaps
even with foresight) the opinions provide information that consumers would find
useful in predicting future outcomes.60
One result of the clash between cultural views of precedent and rule-based
views is that intermediate appellate courts' publication practices have been the
target of academic criticism for years."' But the past year must have set a record
for such criticism from outside of the academy. The California Assembly's
Judiciary Committee, for instance, unanimously approved a bill that would have
required that "[a]ll final opinions of the Supreme Court, of the courts of appeal,
and of the appellate divisions of the superior courts" be "made available for
private publication, in full," and mandated that those opinions "shall constitute
precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis the same as opinions published in
the official reports."'62 The proposed bill, which would have changed the status
of over ninety percent of California's appellate decisions, did not pass the
California Assembly, but it did provoke commentary from almost every legal
organization in the state. Indeed, an entire website exists to challenge
California's (and every other state's) nonpublication and no-citation rules.63
Meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
unconstitutional that circuit's rule condemning unpublished opinions to
58. 2D CIR. R. 0.23.
59. 3D CIR. I.O.P. app. 5.2.
60. This would be true even if the plans worked perfectly to exclude from publication only
non-lawmaking opinions, because applications of rules are as important to practitioners as their
creation. See Robel, supra note 3, at 941-42; see also Boggs & Brooks, supra note 4, at 19-20.
61. See generally Thomas E. Baker, Federal Court Practice and Procedure: A ThirdBranch
Bibliography, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 909, 1092-96 (1999) (citing sources of such criticism).
62. Richard H. Cooper& David R. Fine, What's Past is Prologue, 43 ORANGECouNTYLAw.
27 (2001) (discussing California Assembly Bill 2404). Cooper and Fine quote a California
Legislative Counsel Report, AB 2404 at 4, which states that "93 percent of California Court of
Appeal opinions are unpublished and uncitable." Id.
63. See COMMITTEEFORThERULEOF LAW, at http://www.nonpublication.com (last updated
Nov. 3, 2001) (citing articles and collecting information about cases challenging citation bans).
[Vol. 35:399
THE PRACTICE OF PRECEDENT
nonprecedential status.' Though that decision was later vacated, it generated
enormous discussion,65 among both commentators and journalists," and in other
courts.67 TheAnastasoffdecision ratchets up the clash between practice and rule,
adding another piece to the description of the practice of precedent. It also
provides additional insight into why the rather obscure rules on citation have
garnered political and popular attention.68
A. Anastasoff: Precedent Practice as Normative Commitment
Faye Anastasoff sought a $6000 tax refund, but the government contended
that her request for that refund had arrived one day late. Anastasoff argued that
her request was timely because it had been mailed before the expiration of the
refund period; the IRS disagreed, citing an earlier Eighth Circuit case that had
held the so-called mailbox rule inapplicable.69 Anastasoff argued that the cited
case was unpublished (despite the fact that it had decided an issue of first
impression under federal tax law) and, therefore, nonprecedential under the
Eighth Circuit's rule.7" The Eighth Circuit disagreed, and in an opinion by Judge
Richard Arnold, held its own rule on citation unconstitutional "because it
purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the 'judicial"'
64. See Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
65. A searchthrough the electronic databases for commentary on the Eighth Circuit's opinion
reveals a very large amount of interest in this topic from all segments of the practicing bar, from
periodicals targeted to corporate counsel to lawyers for the public interest. For compilations of new
articles, see COMMTrEE FOR THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 63.
66. See, e.g., Better Not Cite Those Unpublished Opinions Just Yet, 16 FED. LITIGATOR 41
(2001); Jerome I. Braun, Eighth Circuit Decision Intensifies Debate over Publication and Citation
ofAppellate Opinions, 84 JUDICATURE 90 (2000); David R. Fine, Keeping Mum Kills Precedents,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19,2001, at A21.
67. See discussion infra.
68. Anastasoffwas not the first case to have considered the constitutionality ofcitation bans,
although it is the first to have issued a direct ruling on a constitutional ground. See Lance A. Wade,
Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument Against Rules Prohibiting
Citation to UnpublishedJudicialDecisions, 42 B.C.L. REV. 695, 712-15 (2001) (detailing previous
constitutional challenges and arguing that citation bans violate procedural due process).
69. See Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446, at *5-8
(8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam).
70. See 8TH CIR. R. 28(a)(i). The rule provides that
[u]npublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them.
When relevant to establishing the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
law ofthe case, however, the parties may cite an unpublished opinion. Parties may also
cite an unpublished opinion of this court if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve as well.
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within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution."
Judge Arnold's constitutional analysis was both historical and structural. In
his view, the founding generation saw the obligation to follow precedent as
definitional ofjudicial power and at the core of what distinguished the judiciary
from the political branches.72 Moreover, Judge Arnold argued that the obligation
to follow precedent served a separation of powers function, by "limit[ing] the
judicial power delegated to the courts by Article III,"' presumably by assuring
that judges were not free to behave arbitrarily, but were required to justify their
actions in the present by resorting to what they had done in the past-a
classically conservative approach to policy. Thus, "[tihe duty of courts to follow
their prior decisions was understood to derive from the nature of the judicial
power itself and to separate it from a dangerous union with the legislative
power."74 A departure from the doctrine of precedent, noted Judge Arnold,
quoting Justice Joseph Story, "would have been justly deemed [by the Framers]
an approach to tyranny and arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere discretion,
and to the abandonment of all the just checks upon judicial authority."'
Finally, Judge Arnold argued, the rule against treating decisions as
precedential violates a principle of equal treatment. The courts, he said, should
reject a doctrine that, in essence, states, "We may have decided this question the
opposite way yesterday, but this does not bind us today, and, what's more, you
cannot even tell us what we did yesterday."76
TheAnastasoffdecision carefully avoids two potential misconceptions about
its scope. First, Judge Arnold does not advance a view of precedent that requires
"eternal adherence" to previous decisions. Rather, he argues, treating all decided
cases as precedential puts an appropriate burden of justification on the
judiciary.77 Second, treating all decisions as precedent does not on depend on
publication. The Founder's understanding of precedent depended not on
publication, a relatively recent practice, but on the existence of a decision.
Historically, precedent could be established "only by memory or by a lawyer's
unpublished memorandum."" Indeed, argued Judge Arnold, "entry on the
official court record [was] sufficient to give a decision precedential authority
whether or not the decision was subsequently reported. 79
71. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir.), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th
Cir. 2000) (en banc).
72. See id. at 900 ("In sum, the doctrine of precedent was not merely well established; it was
the historic method of judicial decision-making, and well regarded as a bulwark of judicial
independence in past struggles for liberty.").
73. Id.
74. Id. at 903.
75. Id. at 904 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ONTHECONSTITUTION OFTHEUNITED
STATES §§ 377-78 (1833)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 903.
79. Id. at 903 n. 14.
[Vol. 35:399
THE PRACTICE OF PRECEDENT
During Anastasoffs brief tenure as a precedent (and even into its ironic
demise), federal judges cited it to question the citation bans in their courts and
in connection with their own concerns about the application of the publication
rules. The Fifth Circuit, for instance, had in an unpublished opinion held that the
Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) was a state governmental entity entitled to
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment."0 A year and a half later,
a subsequent panel of the Fifth Circuit (which included one of the judges from
the earlier unpublished case) determined that DART was not a state entity and,
therefore, not entitled to immunity. The difference, of course, was that the latter
decision was released for publication.8 ' In dissenting from a petition for
rehearing en banc, three judges noted that the continuing "justification for
refusing to confer precedential status on [unpublished] opinions is. . . tenuous,"
citing the wide availability of such opinions online. 2
In the Ninth Circuit, a dissenting judge accused his court of creating a circuit
split on the question of the interpretation of a sentencing guidelines, citing both
published and unpublished cases. 3 The unpublished cases from the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits apparently represented the only authority in those circuits
interpreting the sentencing guideline as it applied to a particular crime." In the
Fifth Circuit, a district court in Texas published a plea to the court of appeals to
reconsider its citation ban, noting that the holding and reasoning of a recent
unpublished decision of that court would have decided the case before it (and
relying on that decision nonetheless)."
What makes these decisions troubling? Anastasoff's central insight-albeit
an implicit one-is that precedent is not a concept that can successfully be
constrained by rule in a deeply, and historically, common-law legal culture such
as ours. Judge Arnold approaches this insight from the perspective of producers
of opinions, arguing a constitutional duty for a court to acknowledge the
authority-in-fact of its own work product. The power of this critique comes from
its implicit premise that to do otherwise would be to engage in the arbitrary
exercise of authority, because "opinions" are not simply cultural artifacts, but
also the actual decisions of the judiciary with respect to the litigants' lives,
liberty, and property. Imagine a worst-case, if fanciful, scenario: two appeals
involving the validity of the imposition of the death penalty, on the same
80. See Anderson v. DART, 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (mem.).
81. See Williams v. DART, 242 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2001).
82. See Williams v. DART, 256 F.3d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J., dissenting).
83. United States v. Lopez-Pastrana, 244 F. 3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
84. See also United States v. Goldman, 228 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting only authority
on a sentencing guidelines point in the Eighth Circuit was an unpublished case, but stating that
Anastasoffrequired that the case be followed). For a thoughtful discussion in the context of the
state system, see Johns v. State, 35 P.3d 53, 63-67 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (Mannheimer, J.,
concurring).
85. See Encore Video, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, No. Civ.A. SA-97-CAI 139FB, 2000 WL
33348240 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2000); see also Cmty. Visual Communications, Inc. v. City of San
Antonio, 148 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
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grounds, one resulting in reversal-unpublished and therefore uncitable--and the
second resulting in affirmance. No one-no judge or litigant-would find this
an acceptable proposition. But no-citation policies produce equivalent results,
although not so morally outrageous, with regularity. Indeed, the no-citation
policy denounced in Anastasoff would have, if applied in that case, potentially
left Christie, the taxpayer in the unpublished case cited by the government, out-
of-pocket an unspecified amount at the same time Anastasoff collected her
$6000, on diametrically opposed-but not disavowed-interpretations of the
same statute by the same court.
Whether one agrees with Judge Arnold's constitutional analysis, his opinion
describes the process of common-law decisionmaking in deeply cultural terms.
To note the depth of our historical cultural commitment to justification may not
be compelling constitutional analysis, but it is fine cultural observation.
Common-law understandings of precedent entail more than a practical view that
all opinions contain information with predictive value. What makes those
opinions predictive is the requirement of justification for deviance from them.
The normative commitment to justification is as firmly entrenched in our
understandings of precedent as is our belief in the predictive value of case
results. The publication and citation plans are controversial because they violate
every piece of the cultural view.16
B. The Contemporary Irrelevance of Publication and Citation Plans
The empirical assumptions underlying publication plans-the assumption
that decisions can be sorted into precedential and nonprecedential stacks before
they are written, or that such distinctions are even possible-have been widely
discredited. 7  The rationale behind the citation bans-fear of unequal
access-has almost evaporated in the electronic age, which makes these opinions
both accessible and searchable with the laser-like capabilities of modern legal
databases." Large numbers of participants in the federal appellate system,
including judges, use unpublished opinions in ways not contemplated by the
publication plans, although completely consistent with common-law
understandings of practice surrounding precedent. The sheer numbers of these
opinions coupled with the familiarity of judges and lawyers with them have
fueled renewed concerns about the legitimacy of both citation bans and courts'
86. This is the simple answer to the question posed by Boggs and Brooks: "One of the great
puzzles of the unpublished opinion debate is why so many commentators believe [the argument that
citation rules are necessitated by volume] is not good enough." Boggs & Brooks, supra note 4, at
19.
87. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the publication criteria are unrealistic and unfixable); Robel,
supra note 3, at 941-44 (making a similar argument).
88. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Even strong supporters of citation bans admit
that the distinction between published and unpublished opinions "has become a fine, almost
meaningless, distinction in a world of electronic legal research." Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense
of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 186 (1999).
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claims to exemption from the norm of justifying departures from their earlier
decisions.
In the face of Anastasoff and similar criticisms leveled by others, several
judges and commentators have attempted to rehabilitate publication plans, either
by reworking the meaning of precedent, 9 or by providing alternative rationales
for limitations on precedential effect more closely tied to the special roles of
intermediate appellate courts."° While intriguing and thoughtful, these attempts
to reconfigure a set of court docket practices to other purposes are attempts to
rehabilitate a system that should be abandoned.91
The only remaining argument for citation and publication rules-the
argument from caseload-is ultimately unpersuasive. It is unpersuasive not
because the caseload claims of the intermediate appellate courts are overstated;
they are not.92 Though we might romanticize an earlier era, when appellate
courts applied more extensive processes to case decision, increased caseload
without increased decisional capacity now makes that vision unrealistic.
However, saying that courts can do none other than what they do is not the same
as saying that the rules governing what they do make contemporary sense.
To see why the argument from caseload is unpersuasive, take it seriously.
Imagine that courts continue deciding cases in exactly the same way they are
deciding them now, giving to each case exactly the attention it now gets, and
writing exactly what they now write, no more and no less. Next imagine that the
only change is to the rules that govern what lawyers can do with those opinions. 3
What would be lost in abandoning limitations on citation?
Judges make three arguments. First, judges argue that "[t]here is value in
keeping [the] body of law cohesive and understandable, and not muddying the
water with a needless torrent of published [and therefore citable] opinions."'94
89. See, e.g., Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 4 (arguing that predictive power is in the
language and not the fact of a decision, and that judges should be able to control the meaning of
precedent by constraining the concept to those opinions that use particular, authoritative kinds of
language).
90. See, e.g., Berman & Cooper, supra note 4; Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey 0. Cooper,
Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 685 (2001)
[hereinafter Berman & Cooper, Passive Virtues]; Boggs & Brooks, supra note 4 (the authors are
ajudge of the Sixth Circuit and an attorney); Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 4.
91. Cooper & Berman suggest there may be changes to appellate courts' internal rules that
would ease the perceived burden caused by abandoning citation rules. One possibility would be
to ease or reconfigure the federal appellate rules regarding the precedential strength of the decision
of the first appellate panel to consider an issue. See Berman & Cooper, Passive Virtues, supra note
90.
92. See id.
93. This thought exercise assumes that judges both are serious about their claims that they
cannot do more than they are doing now and self-disciplined enough to continue doing it, knowing
that all opinions are similarly open to scrutiny.
94. Martin, supra note 88, at 192. By using the word "torrent," Judge Martin may be making
a different argument, one closer to the earlier arguments about the problems of searching through
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But the value of cohesive and understandable law is that it provides
predictability. If it does so only because cases that would "muddy" that
cohesiveness are exempt from the norm of judicial justification, it is a false
cohesiveness, achieved only by ignoring decisions that create the mud. It
therefore provides few of the benefits of predictability, for (as the lawyers quoted
earlier already suspect), the picture on the surface is partial.
Second, judges argue that the cases that receive less attention really have
little predictive value; indeed, they have negative value. Judges Kozinski and
Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit ask, "[WIhat does precedent mean? Surely it
suggests that the three judges on a panel subscribe not merely to the result but
also to the phrasing of the disposition.""5 Because caseload pressures make it
impossible to craft the phrasing of every opinion, and because in their view it is
the language and not the result of an opinion that has predictive value, lawyers
should stop "[t]rying to extract from [unpublished opinions] a precedential value
that we didn't put into them."'96
The assertion that authors, not readers, control the meaning of their writing
is theoretically contestable,97 and given the history of the publication rules,
highly debatable empirically. If the opinions have negative information, in the
sense these judges suggest, then busy lawyers trained in common-law methods
will not spend time on them. But in the Ninth Circuit, nearly half of the lawyer
respondents read these opinions when they come up in their research. This battle
has been lost.
Finally, there is the burden on judges of having to read and respond to
citations from enlarged sources, and I do not want to discount it.98 However,
there is a serious counterweight. The wide variation in publication rates among
the circuits, coupled with the local variations in the behavior of judges and
reams of decisions articulated by the earliest proponents of the publication plans. Given the views
expressed in the White Commission surveys and the actual practices of those respondents, coupled
with the efficiency of electronic searches, such an argument has little modem force.
95. Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 44.
96. Id. at 81. At bottom, thesejudges argue that the law-development role of the intermediate
appellate courts, coupled with the press of caseload, requires that they be able to control the
meaning of precedent issued by their court. "Not worrying about making law in 3800 [unpublished
opinions each year] frees us to concentrate on those dispositions that affect others besides the
parties to the appeal-the published opinions." Id. at 44. Indeed, the claim is even stronger: by
focusing on the language rather than the fact of decisions, they claim that "judges-like
legislators-have the power to enact prospective legal rules through opinion drafting. Put another
way, ajudicial decision has only as much precedent as the writing judges intend to give it." Boggs
& Brooks, supra note 4, at 22 (discussing Kozinski & Reinhardt article).
97. See, e.g., Blatt, supra note 7, at 629 ("A text acquires meaning only by reference to its
readers. The shared understanding of such readers constitutes the 'interpretive community' for the
text."); FISH, supra note 7.
98. Although I suspect the burden is overstated:judges do not currently respond to every case
a lawyer cites, and if a previously uncitable case is one that requires a serious response, it is
presumably because it makes a serious point.
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lawyers shown through the surveys, demonstrates that we are not living in the
world imagined by the publication plans. When sixty percent of the district
judges in a circuit that published nineteen percent of its decisions feel required
to read those decisions regularly, we can no longer talk as if noncitable opinions
are a trivial issue. The serious issue is the legitimacy issue that was identified in
Anastasoff. The growing circle of criticism-beyond the academy and into
politics-demonstrates that it is time for the intermediate appellate courts to face
up to the plans' infirmities.
CONCLUSION
Law in this country is, in important respects-perhaps in the most important
respects-an activity, a practice. Both unburdened and unaided by the tools that
might mark it as a discipline-a distinctive set of methodologies or an
overarching theoretical paradigm-law gets by nonetheless by creatively
scavenging true disciplines and adhering to practices, such as ethical and logical
norms that, while not distinctive to law, have served the needs of society
adequately, and sometimes spectacularly.
At the metaphorical heart of legal practice, in an historically common-law
system like that of the United States, is a commitment to the idea of precedent.
That commitment has both advantages and drawbacks,99 and in many ways it
seems quaint: law is practiced in many places besides courts that have no
commitment to the hierarchical and analogical reasoning that play such a part in
precedent's role in litigation. But its practical centrality to legal practice in
American courts is hardly controversial.
The publication and citation plans widely adopted twenty-five years ago
strike at this metaphorical heart. They say to American lawyers that vast
numbers of decisions from the appellate courts have less precedential value than,
say, a decision from France, which can be freely cited for whatever persuasive
value it might have. The plans are not accepted in practice by either judges or
lawyers. They should be abandoned.
99. Where to start? At a minimum, precedent offsets optimal justice in individual cases for
other values, such as predictability, stability, or cross-case fairness. For what remains the most
succinct explication and critique of the argument from precedent, see Frederick Schauer, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
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Table 1. Workload and Publication Rates by Circuit, FY 1997
Workload Circuit Total # of appeals Merits Terminations Publication
Rank °  terminated on merits'' byjudgel °  Rate 0 3
1 Eleventh 3287 274 17%
2 Fifth 3423 201 29%
3 Ninth 4825 172 24%
4 Eighth 1827 166 62%
5 Fourth 2378 159 19%
6 Seventh 1561 142 71%
7 Third 1867 133 22%
8 Sixth 2108 132 25%
9 Second 1687 130 39%
10 Tenth 1374 115 36%
11 First 693 116 61%
12 D.C. 730 61 55%
100. This measure is a rough approximation determined by looking at counseled cases
determined on the merits in 1997 per authorized judgeship. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 14, at
101.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 112 (cases with counsel only).
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